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***Education and Morality:
Some New Aspects of an Old Problem****

In December 1918 D.H. LAWRENCE, the English poet, wrote several small essays on the "Education of the people". The problem was, in what relation education and morality can be understood. The essays were offered to the *Times Educational Supplement* for publication, but the editor refused it.¹ This refusal caused LAWRENCE to work on his theses and come to the point. The result was a long essay on the "Education of the People" which was published at the end of 1925 in the collection of essays "Reflections on the death of a Porcupine" (LAWRENCE 1988, p. 85-166).² The collection appeared in a small American publishing house, and it had at least no influence on the contemporary pedagogical debate. LAWRENCE was a literary man, pedagogues did not read his work. What did he have to tell them?

In "Education of the People" we have the following thesis: according to LAWRENCE elementary education had two strong but false ideals

- "1. The perfect citizen.
2. The perfect individual" (ibid., p. 94).

To follow these aims is pointless because no one knows or can tell what is to be understood under the perfect citizen or the perfect individual. "Citizenship has been an indefinite Fata Morgana to the elementary teacher: but self-expression has been a worse.

Before the war we sailed serene under this flag of self-expression. Each child was to *express himself*: why, nobody thought necessary to explain. But infants were to express *themselves*, and nothing but themselves. Here was a pretty task for the teacher: he was to make his pupil *express himself*. Which *self* was left vague" (ibid.).

LAWRENCE knew what he was talking about; the theory of self-expression which goes back to FRANCIS PARKER (1894) had been one of the doctrines of education which constituted the ideological basis of his training as a teacher at the Nottingham University College.³ As

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¹ The reason given was that these papers were rather material for a book than pointed essays (LAWRENCE 1988, p. XXXI with reference to the correspondence).

² Work on the paper "Education of the people" was resumed in June 1920 in Sicily and finished in the mid twenties. "Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine" was published on 7th December 1925 in an American publishing house (Centaur-Press, Philadelphia). The first English edition was not published until 1934, four years after the death of D.H. LAWRENCE.

³ D.H. LAWRENCE (1885-1930) worked from 1902 as a "pupil-teacher" at the British School in his home town Eastwood, Nottinghamshire. From 1905 he worked as an "uncertificated teacher" and in 1906 enrolled himself in the *normal course* of the elementary teacher training at Nottingham University College. In July 1908 he passed his exams and from 1908 to 1911 he worked as an elementary teacher at Davidson Road

many others LAWRENCE became an author *after* he had been a teacher, but unlike others he kept a lasting impression of education. The ideals of education determine a special form of morality which no pedagogue can really fulfill. This is obvious when you look at the objectives, more precisely: when you look at the high-minded aims with which everybody agrees, but of which no one can say what exactly they mean. "Citizenship and self-expression are all right, as ideals for the education of people, if only we knew what we meant by the two terms. The interpretation we give them is just ludicrous. Self-sacrifice in time of need: disinterested nobility of heart to enable each one to vote properly at a general election: an understanding of what is meant by income tax and money interest: all vague and fuzzy" (ibid., p. 95).

My first question is going to be: How is this possible? How can *vague and fuzzy* concepts which can be interpreted any way you like become aims of education with which large groups of pedagogues agree without being able to verify them? (1) In a second step I shall look more closely at the relations between morality and education. It seems that the *bond* with moral aims is the core of the reflection on education which finds it difficult to keep a distance to itself (2). In conclusion I shall interpret the connection between claim and validity in pedagogy, of which the *very narrow* formulation can explain D.H. LAWRENCE'S irritation (3).

I am not talking about special questions on moral education, as they are being discussed today especially in connection with PIAGET and KOHLBERG. The core of every theory on education is a moral postulate, but there are many postulates and they all represent far-reaching claims of validity. They require a connection between morality and education without explaining it; this connection, however, is not at all obvious. My ambition in this lecture will be to make the relation *more* obvious. But I am far away to present any final solution of the problem.

1. Aims and Expectations

Aims of education like *equality* or the *perfectibility of man* are moral idealizations which require unquestioned validity. They do not have to be aware of realities and also not of the consequences of their application, but they seem to be plausible *as* idealizations. But neither are all people unequal, nor are all citizens equal, they are, as D.H.LAWRENCE writes, simply *themselves*, and any kind of generalization remains superficial to them. This goes for empirical laws as well as for transcendental speculations: "We are after all *only* individuals, we are not the eternal life-mystery itself" (ibid., p. 109).

Every theory is an abstraction compared with individual life. But why then is the mystery of the great aims of education effective? The two examples by LAWRENCE -the *perfect citizen* and the *perfect individual* - represent an outstanding duality in the reflection on education since ROUSSEAU, up to KERSCHENSTEINER and NEILL the two examples have been varied and continued without changing or extending the structure. Citizens *or* autonomous people, duties towards society *or* towards the nature of the child, bonds *or* emancipation are also goal topics in the education of the 20th century. At the beginning of *Emile* ROUSSEAU defined the dual structure unmistakably:

School, Croyden, a modern elementary school. In November 1911 he had to give up teaching because of a serious pneumonia (data by MEYERS 1993, ch. 4/6).

"Forcé de combattre la nature ou les institutions sociale, il faut opter entre faire *un homme* ou *un citoyen*; car on ne peut faire à la fois l'un et l'autre" (O.C. IV/p. 248; italics by J.O.).

D.H. LAWRENCE was an outsider in the discourse of education, but a strong one. With his thesis of *individuality* one can discuss more than just dualism.⁴ It is destructive to *all* ambition in education. The one who wants to educate "citizens" has the *same* problem of effectiveness as the one who wants to educate "people". The aim - *le but* (ibid., p. 247) - is not easier or more secure when one follows nature and not society; aims of education as such are insecure because they are communicated in a *vague and fuzzy* way and insofar they can never give a definite form of operation. This can be seen in the history of the concepts and in the connection of their use. "Nature" and "society", "human being" and "citizen" are *watchwords* for highly contradicting theories of education which develop in very different contexts and which obviously need the dualism in order to appear plausible. MARIA MONTESSORI'S rigid method of learning is supposed to agree with "nature" and, therefore, with the development of the child, as much as ALEXANDER NEILL'S permissive new school of education ADOLPHE FERRIERE'S *école active*, the new gymnastics developed by JACQUES-DALCROCE or the expressive drawing by FRANZ CIZEK.⁵ KERSCHENSTEINER'S work school was supposed to educate the citizen, but also DEWEY'S Laboratory School, or the specific English traditions of education which were described by CYRIL NORWOOD,⁶ the French *écoles nouvelles* (Landerziehungsheime/⁷ and of course also the German concepts of "Lebensgemeinschaftsschule".⁸

All these cases are not concerned with the same topic, the political, theoretical and aesthetic concepts are almost always radically different. But the reflection on education can use *identical* concepts and dualisms which give the *impression* of identity. Are they not all concerned with the *one* nature of "the" child? And is there not just *one* problem of society which needs to be worked on, in spite of all differences, the Contrat Social of the citizens of

⁴ LAWRENCE himself replaces his own dualism by another one which had a strong influence on his entire thinking, the dualism of *organic* and *mechanic* organization of life. He explicitly uses the term "duality" (LAWRENCE 1988, p. 111).

⁵ In 1906 FRANZ CIZEK (1865-1946) was appointed professor of ornamental drawing at the school of arts in Vienna. In 1908 he founded the "Jugendkunstklasse" which became famous because of its method of free drawing. The children were regarded as artists and could express themselves freely in their drawings.

⁶ CYRIL NORWOOD who presented the Norwood-Report on the revision of the curricula and school examinations (1943) was headmaster of the "Harrow-School" from 1926 to 1934 and president of the St. John's College in Oxford from 1934 to 1946. His book "The English Tradition of Education" (1929) intended to ward off approaches of the *radical education* (of child orientation) and formulated principles of public education.

⁷ In 1898 the French historian EDMOND DEMOLINS (1852-1907) founded the *Ecole des Roches*, a private new school following the example of the English Abbotsholme. DEMOLINS justified the new school politically with the weakness of the French state. The polemic "A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?" (1897) attributed the English superiority directly to the better schools of the elite.

⁸ After the First World War "Lebensgemeinschaftsschulen" were founded in several German cities, especially in Hamburg and Berlin where social democratic administrations carried through political school experiments. In contrast with other reform pedagogical concepts "staatsbürgerlich" here meant an education for the republic, not just for the community.

which already ROUSSEAU did not know how it was to be related with "education" (and then with *natural* education).

The historical concept of education is dualistic; there are only two paradigms of educational theory, the *development of nature* and the *influence of society* (OELKERS 1993/94). The dynamic of modern pedagogy develops from the *contrast* of development and influence, the paradigms are being understood in a dual way, the one cannot be the other although both of them can also be used in combination. If "education" is thought of as *influence*, as with JOHN LOCKE, this can be a precondition for the right development of nature; if "education" is understood as *development*, as with ROUSSEAU, then a suitable influence can be derived from it, at least theoretically. The combination, however, is always the consequence of the dualism which can explain the variations and the placing of the emphasis in the reflection on education. Who is on the side of the child, cannot in the same way represent the side of society, and only on the side of the child a conclusion to *nature* is obvious.

More important than the dualism is the formal agreement in the construction of the theory. In both cases education is conceived *teleologically*, in the first case nature is connected with *biological* process assumptions, in the second case society is connected with *historical* process assumptions. The explanation is different, the pedagogical expectation is not: Education always leads *to something*, it should *reach goals* and it is fixed on the creation of a *certain future* which is designed for the child or the society and in most cases for both of them. Education - the right education - would be the path which leads to this future.

Educational theories are, therefore, *goal theories*; the language of education itself, its rhetoric and its pathetic assumptions refer to *future* and in the future *better* conditions of the human being and the world. These future and better conditions are strived for pedagogically - I could also say they are supposed to be created pedagogically. The aim implicates the possibility of achievement, at least approximation, i. e. a process of continuous perfection which is equated with the overcoming or even the loss of *evil*. The aims of education connect social and cultural expectations which count on progress and not on decay. In other words: education cannot be thought of as a media of decadence, of decay, it *must* have optimistic aims. This is an *assumption*, but it appears as an empirical, real dimension and not as a necessary or inevitable fiction. An *as-if*⁹ philosophy has never been accepted in educational theory, because all aims apply to *real* people and corporations - children and societies - whose future cannot be considered as a fiction. But is education the medium to create futures?

This can be called a variant of the *naturalistic fallacy* with which G.E. MOORE opened his *Principia Ethica*: The aim of education is the *good*, it is defined as attainable but it can only be understood as universal and as such it is *unattainable*.¹⁰ A second fallacy is connected

⁹ The neokantian fictionalism of HANS VAHINGER ("Die Philosophie des Als-Ob", 1911) had 10 editions until 1927, but it was not generally accepted in pedagogy. An actual reception cannot be proven.

¹⁰ Essential for MOORE'S thesis of naturalistic fallacy is the difference between "good" and "the good", traditionally understood as quality and idea. "The good" can be defined (MOORE 1970, p. 38c.), but "good itself" cannot be defined. The quality "good", which is a condition of the noun "the good", is "not capable of any definition" (ibid., p. 39). If one defines *the* good, then *all* qualities are included; independently of this there is

with this: "education" appears as a *real* dimension although all expectations are *fictitious*. There appears no difference between the ideal goal and the *language* of education, and therefore it is easy to draw conclusions from the expectation to the experience - or from the language of the future to the future *itself*. The good is expected from education but the expectation is withdrawn from experience. No experience can ever fulfill the ultimate good but that is what is expected, at least as a concrete form of utopia.

How far that goes can be seen with D.H. LAWRENCE who criticizes education in order to surpass it essentially. According to him the education to be a citizen and the development of the human being were aims of the official, the state education and went to the debit of real individuality. "You can obtain one kind of perfect citizen by suppressing individuality and cultivating the public virtues: which has been the invariable tendency of reform, and of social idealism in modern days" (LAWRENCE 1988, p. 113). Real individuality always bears a spark of danger, "a menace to society. Quench this spark and you quench the individuality, you obtain a social unit, not an integral man. All modern progress has tended, and still tends, to the production of quenched social units: dangerless beings, ideal creatures!" (ibid., p. 114).

But this suspicion is *as much* an educational obsession as the contrary one which says, that too much individuality destroys society. In both cases "education" is thought of as *a great causality* which either creates the right or the wrong thing, while it is not clear, what education itself is supposed to be. Its own concept is *vague and fuzzy* as MAX BLACK (1944) and others have demonstrated. Education is first of all a metaphor, a literary definition which always only implies reality. The more this implication is darkened by morality, the stronger the power of the metaphor gets; in the end it can appear as a historical *reality*, as a social *power*, as a form of *being*, without having to account for the difference of language and object - of realities and definitions.¹¹

The object is imagined as though it stands in front of the educator and can be used for the purpose of education. This goes for nature and society likewise, the natural education is not imagined differently from the social education. The chief witness is ROUSSEAU; his first rule for natural education is valid for all variants of education:

"Observez la nature, et suivez la route qu'elle vous trace. Elle exerce continuellement les enfans; elle endurent leur tempérament par des épreuves de toute espèce; elle leur apprend de bonne heure ce que c'est que peine et douleur" (O.C.IV/p. 259).

But education is not botanics as little as it is social technology or psychotherapy. It cannot place "the" nature, "the" society or "the" soul in front of itself, observe it from the outside and then find out what is best for itself. However, path metaphors - metaphors of *ways* and *routes* - are crucial for the assumptions of effects: education appears as the "path of nature", the "progress of society" or the "inner route of the human soul".

nothing what *is* "good" (ibid., p.40cc., 43). Who defines "the good", can refer to *nothing outside* which would be the most important in the claim to know what is good.

¹¹ In the concept historical reconstruction of the German noun "die Erziehung" I follow the Bernese dissertation of LORENZ VON POGRELL (1996). It demonstrates how religious "Aufladungen" have replaced the description of activities like "ernähren" and "erziehen" by an abstract general term.

The great expectations only make sense if one concludes directly from the metaphor education to reality. This can be demonstrated in all fields of general education: education is understood as if it could globally *serve peace*, generally *care for emancipation*, universally *bring about happiness*, unrestrictedly *develop nature*, or generally *develop democracy*. The variety alone of these aims questions the assumption that education could be understood as a uniform process, unless one connects the aims and defines them as being identical with the idea of the good. But then the problem would only shift: Platonists alone can assume that ultimately there is *one* idea of the good which determined morality and caused education. In reality "the good" is always plural, the absolute of the idea applies to *every* good, whereas the variety alone of educational theories cannot be reduced to *one* and *only* one idea of the good (OELKERS 1996).

This leads to my second point, the relation of morality and education according to *post Platonic* theories.

2. Morality and education

In 1932 JEAN PIAGET held his lecture "L'évolution Sociale et la Pédagogie Nouvelle"¹² in which he rejected a theory on the relation of morality and education by EMILE DURKHEIM. This theory, the *physique des moeurs et des droits*, which had been developed by DURKHEIM in several lectures and had instantly become known in the twenties, appeared to have a great influence on the contemporaries.¹³ DURKHEIM'S starting point was the secularization of morality: how can we understand morality and education if the social differentiation releases individualization, ensures far-reaching differences in the experiences, and subsequently promotes universal values which are no longer connected with immediate sanctions? (DURKHEIM 1991, p. 158 cc.) According to DURKHEIM 1902/1903 "morality is not simply a system of habits, it is a system of commands ... At the root of moral life lies, besides the taste for regularity, the sense for moral authority" (DURKHEIM 1973, p. 85).

PIAGET reacts against this opinion: according to him DURKHEIM'S thesis led to the point that education could *only* be authoritarian; the educators were the representatives of society, they had to force subject matters on the children about which these could not decide, the values of society, or the morality of the group. The source of this, DURKHEIM said, does not lie within us, it lies in society. The society creates and protects those riches of civilization,

¹² The lecture was held on 1st August 1932 in Nice. PIAGET was director of the Bureau International de l'Education in Geneva; the bureau was founded in 1925 in connection with the endeavours of reform pedagogy to internationalize. An international organization, the *New Education Fellowship*, existed since 1921. In 1932 PIAGET spoke at the 6th world conference of this association. Its general topic was "Education in a Changing Society" (ROEHRS 199, p. 23cc.).

¹³ PIAGET refers to the lecture "L'éducation morale" which was held at the Sorbonne in 1902/1903. A first book edition appeared in 1922. The general view of the *physique des moeurs et du droit* comes from lectures held by DURKHEIM in Bordeaux (until 1902) as well as in Paris. An integral text of these lectures did not appear until 1950. MARCEL MAUSS had previously only made the 3 lectures on the vocational morality accessible (Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 1937). DURKHEIM himself became the successor of FERDINAND BUISSON in the chair of educational science at the Sorbonne.

without which man would fall back to the level of the animals (ibid., p. 122). According to PIAGET this theory ignored the conditions of the creation of morality which is not *inherited* but is *created new* in the ways of life of the children. Children overcame their egocentrism by their *own* group-life, *their* forming a society which has two characteristics, *coopération* and *réciprocité* (PIAGET 1932, p. 311), symmetric relations and not authority and force.

Morality can only then be understood in an authoritarian way if it is valid as an unquestioned tradition in the way in which DURKHEIM himself wanted the old morality of the tribe or the house to be understood. What DURKHEIM (1991, p. 157) calls "modern world", the avoiding of "individual suffering" and the promotion of individual happiness (ibid., p. 159), excludes authoritarian reverting so that DURKHEIM'S pedagogy has to be understood as a self-contradiction. PIAGET says that the new education insists on the opposite of authority, the free relationships between the children - "Ce trésor de coopération" (PIAGET 1932, p. 312) - , from which the society of the future will develop. Morality must not be "implanted" but must develop, and it has only one condition, the psychology of the child. From this results a contra-thesis to DURKHEIM whom PIAGET always considered as a fundamental antipode:

"Ce n'est pas à nous qu'il appartient d'inculquer à l'enfant un idéal politique, un idéal économique, un idéal social trop précis. Ce qu'il faut lui fournir, c'est simplement une méthode, un instrument psychologique fondé sur la réciprocité et sur la coopération" (ibid.).

This contrast is fundamental for the education of the 20th century: it orientates itself as *éducation nouvelle* or as *progressive education* by the individuality of the child, but with this the question immediately arises, what secures the social norms if they are no longer to be "implanted". PIAGET offers a further idealization, now of the interactions between children which correspond to the *image* which the new education has of itself, but which can hardly be valid as realistic descriptions of the children's actual experiences with social exchange. *Réciprocité* and *coopération* are ideals, idealizations of how the moral exchange between children should develop, they do not capture realities which always have to do also with the opposite - hierarchy and power.

But on the other hand, also DURKHEIM'S theory of social physics is illusory, because it relies on the *power* of education. If social differentiation promotes *relativity*, then education cannot rely on an absolute authority which, well understood, it cannot be itself. A secular morality may still think of itself as being "holy" but it unavoidably has competition which can no longer be set back by religious duties. The modern problem of education is the consequence of "modern morality", but DURKHEIM draws an illusory conclusion. He wants to connect education with the *spirit of discipline* at precisely that historical moment, in which the connection between education and discipline became questionable and lost its impact. And that is only possible if, for pedagogues too, morality *no longer* expresses the nature of society (DURKHEIM 1973, p. 161).

But what is it then? PIAGET insofar catches an important point as he questions the equation of morality with tradition and enables new pedagogical optics. "Morality" is not a rigid system of rules or orders or commands which is stored somewhere in a collective memory and can be recalled by education. Education has no memory as a condition,¹⁴ but children

¹⁴ This does not exclude a *cultural memory* after MAURICE HALBWACHS, but there is no direct causality; cultural tradition forms a frame for education, not a determination,

which are not burdened with a moral heritage, but learn to participate in moral communication. The conviction of doctrines may *later* appear as a heritage, but children learn traditions not *as* heritage but in and by social exchange from which attitudes and convictions gradually and unpredictably develop.

PIAGET suggested a guarantee, the nature of the child, out of which the *desired* morality will develop, step by step and without losses. But his idea is much more convincing if one loosens the idealization of *réciprocité* and *coopération*, and proceeds from very different socializations which exclude uniform teleologies, because they are reconstructions of experiences. In the end the one, great goal of education is not achieved, there is no end at all, only the next learning situation which can start unforeseen and can end unexpectedly without that "morality" could control this experience. Children are living beings, not pedagogical objects.

"We do not have to draw out or educe positive activities from a child, as some educational doctrine would have it. Where there is life, there are already eager and impassioned activities. Growth is not something done to them; it is something they do" (DEWEY 1966, p. 42).

This was written by JOHN DEWEY in 1916 in "Democracy and Education" *against* the authoritarian tradition of the educational theory, but also against certain positions of the child orientated education to which PIAGET was close. DEWEY is an opponent who was hardly considered by PIAGET, although he formulated an objection which questions the whole construction of PIAGET,¹⁵ i.e. the view of development as a movement towards a fixed goal: "Growth is regarded as *having* an end, instead of *being* an end" (ibid., p. 50). Development could not be related to an immanent aim of itself, it only referred to more growth. And that had enormous consequences for the theory of education: "There is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education" (ibid., p. 51).

"More" is not the opposite of "less", DEWEY does not think of education as an increase or loss, but as a continuation of experience in always new situations, in this sense Darwinistic, i.e. as an uninterrupted adaption of the *one* life. This is dramatic insofar as such a theory of education cannot count on moral certainties and can even less produce them. Such a construction - producing certainties *before* experience - would require Platonic ideas, in its consequence one would always know in advance what is "good" and the only problem left is how to teach it to others (LW 4/p. 214cc.)

. But "the good", according to DEWEY 1929 in the "Quest for Certainty", is as much a problem of experimental learning, as science, education or policy.¹⁶ It only attains a special

otherwise there would be no change and not even a continuation of tradition which can probably be kept creative because of this loose connection with education. This is an old assumption of culture pedagogics which goes back to SCHLEIERMACHER and was taken up again e.g. by THEODOR LITT (1921). It matches newer theories of the cultural memory (e.g. CONNERTON 1989; comp. OELKERS 1995).

¹⁵ This concerns the *genetical logics* which JAMES BALDWIN mentioned, i.e. the application of the theory of evolution to child psychology. This is not a new topic but was a thoroughly constructed theory programme long before PIAGET ("Piaget before Piaget". VIDAL 1994).

¹⁶ The Platonic philosophy of education expresses *these* conditions: PLATO "never got any conception of the indefinite plurality of activities which may characterize an

holiness and authority in feudal pre-modern conditions . But then the "modern morality" has a totally different basis, as DURKHEIM and PIAGET - each for himself - assumed, i.e. the continued experience which can change everything except itself. From this DEWEY concludes: "Any belief as such is tentative, hypothetical" (ibid., p. 221), every following experience can disprove every previous dogma, provided the anomalies become too great and the reality is too far ahead of the belief.

Moral rules do not have an "intrinsic nature" (ibid., p. 222), assumptions of this kind go back to Platonic teachings (ibid., p. 219) which see the *soul* in the body, the *being* in the soul and the *idea* in the being, without being able to distance this idealization. The idealization is considered to be independent of general conditions, and that makes Platonic teachings dangerous. They can hold their definition of the good as the only one which is true and have to draw authoritarian consequences: the true idea is implanted into the children without them being able to say "no". The *great chain of being* could not be continued otherwise, every contradiction - especially from children - would have to be understood as an interruption of the good itself.¹⁷

According to DEWEY this would be the *final* or the *ultimate* illusion of education, the sense of DEWEY, the continuation of the good *against* all experiences, whereas education can only appear *as* experience. In the sense of DEWEY values and morality are not simply "here", represented as an *idea*, independent of historical processes of learning which create new what the pedagogical reflection finds as condition (ibid., p. 227). Without context no reality - that is how one could summarize these findings in view of the present state of the discussion, but it is difficult for education to get involved in this, because it pursues *absolute* aims which would let any relativation appear to be not credible. On the other hand, education historicizes itself constantly: The language of education is highly variable, it adapts to subsequent problem situations and is continuously handed down, without being connected with Platonic ideas. What it hands down are real communications, i.e. describable contexts which deal with "education" and "morality", recalled by conflicts and deficit assumptions which are as flexible as the language of education itself (OELKERS 1996a).

Campaigns for *political correctness* (DUNANT 1994) are as much contexts for moral education as debates on *multiculturalism* (GUTMANN 1994), *feministic ethics* (NODDINGS 1984, 1992) or curricula revisions *in favour* of political correct, multicultural and feministic viewpoints (GRAFF 1992; CRANOCHAN 1993). How then can one decide about truth and validity? How then can morality and education be connected if it is always only viewpoints which confront each other? Viewpoints can be connected or considered as irreconcilable contrasts, but they are never more than "viewpoints", perspectives of the world, not the world itself.

This leads me to my last point, the relation between claim and validity of education. If "morality" is not simply being stored as authority, but if it does not develop from the social genesis of children, if even moral sentences are hypotheses which have to prove themselves, how then is education to be understood?

individual and a social group, and consequently limited his view to a limited number of *classes* of capacities and social arrangements" (DEWEY 1966, p. 88).

¹⁷ Platonic continuations can neither think of increase nor of change: "The process of time brings no enrichment to the world's diversity" (LOVEJOY 1936), p. 244).

3. Claim and Validity

In his famous "Nachforschungen" of 1797, the central version of his general theory, PESTALOZZI understands the problem of "modern education" as imagination of innocence, which dissolves the moral duty. The human being understands himself according to nature and society, but without an inner sense which can only develop when guilt and sin are not being denied. Freedom is limited by sin, this requires christian faith and the old society:

"Der Bürger der Gott läugnet, erklärt sich dadurch, dass er mitten in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft die Freiheit seines Instinktes anspreche, und diesen als den sichern Führer seines Lebens erkenne, damit aber stellt er iede Kraft, die die *innere Veredelung* seiner selbst, so wie die Sicherheit seiner gesellschaftlichen Ausbildung möglich macht, *in sich selbst still*" (KA 12/p. 155).

According to PESTALOZZI instincts are part of *nature*; who follows them is lost, also who lives in *society* simply as a citizen. What is missing is the "innere Veredelung" i.e. *education*. If we follow PESTALOZZI, education concerns not only nature, nor only society, but essentially the soul of the human being, i.e. the instance of conscience (Gewissen). Conscience- Gewissen - is autonomous with regard to nature and society, it only depends on religion and belief. *Religion* PESTALOZZI writes "muss die Sache der Sittlichkeit seyn" (ibid.), who does not believe cannot be educated; and PESTALOZZI says clearly what belief is: "Der Irrthum und das Unrecht der Juden und der Griechen mussten der Lehre Jesu Christi vorhergehen, um die Menschen für sie empfänglicher zu machen" (ibid., p. 156/157).

What PESTALOZZI calls "das Christenthum" and what he equates with "Sittlichkeit" (ibid., p. 157), is a *protestant* construction which actually has had a lasting influence on educational theory. Only in this way the "Individualität des einzelnen Menschen" could be thought of and the "einzelne Mensch" could appear as addressee of *universal* values - "Wahrheit und Recht" (ibid., p. 157-161). But this single person cannot contradict and cannot change the context, in other words, the protestant construction requires duty which is reinforced *by* the individualization and can appear as a task of the "innere Veredelung". The "innerself", however, is doctrine, after PESTALOZZI a pietistic theory of the Christian soul which *cannot* be dealt with individually.

This was observed especially by D.H. LAWRENCE : Modern education does not really serve each own self, but beyond this it serves objectives, political, economical and not last religious doctrines which follow a totally different principle *in the name* of individuality, the development of idealized units which define virtue and duty *for themselves* and demand following (LAWRENCE 1950, p. 94). Modern education and policy were incapable of simply acknowledging "my own pure self" which knows how to live without comparison with others, purely out of itself, as others live for themselves:

"There is me, and there is *another being*. That is the first part of reality. There is no comparing or estimating. There is only this strange recognition of *present otherness*" (ibid., p. 92).

This early variant of constructivism has antipedagogical consequences if "education" is thought of as a process of "innere Veredelung". The actual being of the soul, its acute presence, plays no role if conscience is to be trained. Spontaneity must be excluded as

much as radical differentness: Inner purification can only be thought of as being uniform. Theories of the conscience which would accept extreme variants have not been developed anywhere at least in education. All human beings must have *one and the same* conscience, the ideal norm cannot be divided because otherwise the whole moral claim would collapse.

From this LAWRENCE derived a far-reaching conclusion, the overcoming of the sensualistic equation of education with habit or the forming of habit. ROUSSEAU had argued against LOCKE "la seule habitude qu'on doit laisser prendre à l'enfant est de n'en contracter aucune" (O.C.IV/ p. 282), but his own "natural education" was essentially training and suppressing although, compared with LOCKE, with indirect methods which were supposed to maintain the appearance of freedom and spontaneity. For ROUSSEAU education is an unwilling paradox, "la liberté bien réglée" (ibid., p. 321). LAWRENCE, on the other hand, is serious about the freedom of the individual nature which is understood as being independent of morality and free of duty or inner agreement:

"The only thing man has to trust to in coming to himself is his desire and his impulse. But both desire and impulse tend to fall into mechanical automatism: to fall from spontaneous reality into dead or material reality. All our education should be a guarding against this fall" (LAWRENCE 1950. p. 91).

If the previous analysis of the concept education is accurate, then the *should be* is insurmountable, but on both or on all sides of the problem. Education is always the attempt, not the effect; effects and intentions are different things, and no intention can produce effects precisely to the aims of education. There will always be a *should be*, some hopes that education will be finally effective whereas next years experience might give us a different point of view or at least other thoughts about what education is all about. All classical theories implied the *arrival* of goals, for PESTALOZZI the "innere Veredelung" will come into being, for ROUSSEAU nature guarantees development and thus education, even LAWRENCE understands his variant of the *éducation négative*¹⁸ as a *real* and *effective* protection of the spontaneous self.

On the other hand all *problems* remain: Every morality needs some form of inner resonance which is not simply given; no morality tolerates arbitrary divisibility; all education groups itself around a moral core, also then, when morality is to be abolished with education. It is always only the morality in general and thus the morality of the others. No suggestion for *political correctness* takes itself back, divides itself or says it could also be quite different; but every suggestion for *political correctness* claims, that what it negates, is really bad. In the same way feminist ethics *must negate* what it excludes, or multicultural tolerance *must* be intolerant towards all essential objections. One cannot at the same time support multicultural variety and recommend the opposite; at least this would violate a basic condition of moral presence, *absolute credibility*.

BERNARD WILLIAMS (1985, p. 194cc.) has pointed out a condition of all systems of morality which he defined as *purity*. What is meant by this is the closed ideality of morals which refer only to itself without being able to relieve itself by relative contexts. Justice, responsibility, or tolerance are not divisible, they must somehow be imagined and treated as *pure*. On the other hand, they are not pre-empiric ideas which would (or could) be

¹⁸ ROUSSEAU'S version was the following: "la première éducation doit ... être purement négative. Elle consiste, non point à enseigner la vertu ni la vérité, mais à garantir le coeur du vice et l'esprit de l'erreur" (O.C. IV/p. 323).

sufficient for themselves. They are translated into public communication which is accompanied by moral reactions described by WILLIAMS as "institutions of blame" (ibid., p. 1939): "Almost all worthwhile human life lies between the extremes that morality puts before us. It starkly emphasizes a series of contrasts: between force and reason, persuasion and rational conviction, shame and guilt, dislike and disapproval, mere rejection and blame" (ibid., p./195).

Essential in this description is the fact that moral judgement takes place *in public*. It is not simply a private matter, also not a mystery, not a dialogue of the soul with God, and not simply the intimate decision for or against duty. "Morality" would thus be communication with consequences, sometimes *grave* consequences, not the tradition of a group in contradiction with the "spontaneous self". This communication in public is triggered off by events and conflicts in society, to which education should react. But no education can give "morality" a complete and lasting validity, but rather it is itself *moral communication* which dictates or excludes what should be done (respectively omitted) without having any other sanctions at its disposal than the "institutions of blame". Pedagogy simply discusses the *topics* of education and suggests consequences, but it does not control the practice of education in any unerring sense. The effect consists of the uninterrupted discussion of the problem, provided education refers to the connection which DEWEY had called in 1927 "The public and its Problems". If one understands education in this way, then other conclusions than those of the pedagogical tradition become obvious.

Modern societies require processes of experimental learning (DEWEY 1927, p. 199cc.), their morality is public, thus also their education can only be public. It is no longer a matter of dubious control of the soul, also not a matter of adaption to traditions, but of public experiences which make "education" appear in praxis as cooperation (GAUTHIER 1990) or as negotiation (BRUNER 1986). The process is being controlled by inner and outer observations, e.g. by shame and the assignment and rejection of guilt. Education would then still be connected with morality, but not as *nature* or "development", and also not as *society* or "effect".

Both traditional concepts count on clear effects, lasting impressions, the final reaching of the ultimate goal. Children should become good adults, but that excludes learning or reduces learning to teaching morals. Real learning requires *detours*, *irritations*, *paradoxes*, everything surprisingly new that is *not* connected with aims of education but nevertheless excites, animates and encourages the experience of children. Who reduces this tension only has a clear *theory*; *life* is a different thing. Realities of education are often *alinear*, sometimes *chaotic* and always forced to *balance* the orders of morality. One could agree in this matter with GEORGE BERNARD SHAW. In his "Maxims for Revolutionists" (1903) he brings the problems of morality and education to the point:

"Do not give your children moral and religious instructions unless you are quite sure they will not take it too seriously" (SHAW 1957, p. 254).

For those who immediately want to make a normative pedagogy from this irony SHAW adds: "The golden rule is that there is no golden rule" (ibid., p. 251).

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